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Abstract 
Financial and business services (FABS) as intermediaries play a significant role in global 
production networks (GPNs). Yet the mechanisms through which they influence the 
activities of lead and supplier firms in GPNs have received little in-depth attention. The 
paper addresses this shortcoming and examines how global legal business services 
configure the financial discipline of transnational corporations in Southeast Asia. It 
documents the way FABS articulate financial imperatives and encourage the reproduction 
of ‘global financial architectures’. It also shows, however, that temporal dynamics and 
spatial specificities in the power relations between FABS and transnational corporations 
(TNCs) generate variegated financial configurations. Southeast Asian TNCs adopt and 
adapt in ways that serve their interests. This implies that the governance effects of FABS 
have important temporal and spatial contingencies that need to be accounted for in 
analyses of GPNs.  
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The global production networks (GPN) approach has, since its inception, taken account 
of the importance of the service economy. From one perspective this implies a focus on 
global service production networks, such as in retail (Coe and Wrigley, 2007; Coe and 
Lee, 2013). From another perspective, it also means focussing on services as ‘lubricators’ 
(Dicken, 2015) of all production networks. Studies of logistics (Bowen and Leinbach, 
2006; Hess and Rodrigue, 2006) exemplify this intermediary ‘lubrication’ role in which 
services contribute to the functioning of the transnational corporations (TNCs) that make 
up a GPN. The intermediary role of services is the focus of this article. 
Despite recognition of the importance of service intermediaries to GPN research, 
two interrelated empirical gaps have been identified in existing understanding of services 
as “strategically important inputs to a wide range of global production networks” (Coe 
and Yeung, 2015: 25). First, as part of the GPN 2.0 agenda, the need to further study the 
influence of intermediary services on firm strategy has been emphasised. Intermediary 
services such as law and logistics “bridge and connect multiple actors” (Coe and Yeung, 
2015: 50), given their “provision of unique inputs, most intangible in nature, to make 
these networks work” (Coe and Yeung, 2015: 51). Yet we have little knowledge of the 
power relations between service intermediaries and TNCs, the effects on firm strategy 
and ultimately on the organisation of GPNs. Second, the need for a better understanding 
of the role in GPNs of financial and business services (FABS) intermediaries in particular 
has been highlighted. FABS intermediaries include services such as accounting, 
advertising, law and management consultancy that operate in and through world cities. 
They also include financial institutions that are “providers of highly specialized 




operation of GPNs” (Coe et al., 2014: 764). In particular, FABS found in world cities like 
London, New York and Singapore have a ‘command and control’ (Sassen, 2000: 3) 
function: they drive TNCs in GPNs to ‘work with financial discipline’ (Coe and Yeung, 
2015), i.e., strongly promote the use of particular financial models and structures of 
corporate organisation and the delivery of ‘expected’ levels of financial performance. 
This leads to TNCs and GPNs that are structured in ways designed to serve the logics of 
financialization (Baud and Durand, 2012; Milberg, 2008; Wood et al., 2016). We know, 
however, very little about how FABS exercise such ‘command and control’ influence in 
GPNs and the effects of such influence on TNCs in different world regions. 
This paper responds to the two empirical gaps outlined above. In line with recent 
shifts to prioritise analysis of the firms – i.e. TNCs – that comprise GPNs, and not just 
the networks themselves (Coe and Yeung, 2015; Fuller and Phelps, 2018; MacKinnon, 
2012), the paper addresses the following question: How do FABS intermediaries 
configure the financial discipline of TNCs? The paper responds to this question by 
analysing the effects of one type of FABS – global legal services - on the financial 
structuring of Southeast Asian lead and supplier TNCs.  
The analysis makes two theoretical contributions. First, by focussing on the 
practices of FABS firms, and the way these practices are enacted in relationships with 
TNCs, the analysis reveals how FABS articulate financial imperatives and promote and 
prioritise what they consider to be legitimate forms of financial discipline. Drawing on 
practice-based approaches in economic geography (e.g. Jones and Murphy, 2011), and 
practice-based studies of FABS in particular (Bassens and van Meeteren, 2015; 
Faulconbridge and Hall, 2014) which emphasise the importance of analysing the 




highlights the narratives and actions that allow FABS to configure the financial discipline 
of TNCs. For wider work on GPNs the focus on practices highlights the importance of 
in-depth analyses of the specificities of the interactions between different actors in GPNs 
and the substantive effects of these interactions, something often missed by meso-level 
analyses which do not account for the specific factors influencing firms’ strategies.  
Second, and building on the insights from a practice-focussed analysis, the paper 
advances existing studies of power in GPNs (e.g. Gibbon et al., 2008; Bair and Werner, 
2011; Coe and Yeung, 2015; Dallas et al., 2017). It draws attention to the importance of 
a relational perspective (Allen, 2003; Faulconbridge, 2012) on power that both moves 
beyond analyses of lead-supplier firm dyads, and that takes account of the unpredictable 
outcomes of contestations between different actors in GPNs (Ouma, 2010). By adopting 
a relational perspective the paper reveals that the governance effect of the articulating of 
financial imperatives by FABS firms is mediated by dynamic power relations; FABS 
exercising power with and over TNCs, but also being resisted by TNCs. This creates a 
situation in which FABS-TNCs relationships are the basis for the variegated configuring 
of the financial discipline of TNCs. Southeast Asian TNCs increasingly adopt and adapt 
the models promoted by FABS in ways that service their specific interests. This reminds 
us of the importance of a temporally dynamic and spatially situated analysis of the causal 
mechanisms associated with GPN structure and spatial organisation. 
 
2. Financial and business services in GPNs 
Recognition of the need for a deeper understanding of the role of FABS as intermediaries 




strategies of lead and supplier firms of plethora of “underplayed actors and influences” 
(Coe and Yeung, 2015: 21). These actors and their governance effects are key to 
understanding why TNCs adopt particular organizational forms and strategies that 
ultimately affect the characteristics and spatiality of GPNs.  Governance in this context 
refers to “the authority and power relationships that determine how financial, material 
and human resources are allocated and flow” (Gereffi, 1994: 97).  To date, a tendency to 
focus on lead-supplier firm dyads as part of studies of GPN governance (Gereffi et al., 
2005) has led to the neglect of the power relations between TNCs and important actors 
such as FABS (Dallas et al., 2017). As Coe and Yeung (2015: 51) argue in relation to 
intermediaries, a key issue is that research “has not paid much attention to these power 
brokers, who enable the effective functioning of global production networks”.  
 
2.1 Business service intermediaries as institutional agents 
How, then, might we conceive of the governance effects of FABS intermediaries? 
Previous studies of intermediaries (Beaverstock et al., 2010; Coe et al., 2009; Phelps and 
Wood, 2018) emphasise the importance of viewing FABS as active institutional agents 
involved in the construction of particular economic and spatial forms of organization. 
Illustrating such active agency, Munir et al. (2018) highlight consultants as major 
influences on the strategies of Pakistani supplier firms in apparel GPNs. Consultancy 
TNCs, embedded in a transnational field of “globally dominant imaginaries” (Munir et 
al., 2018: 577), promote particular models of labour management, this ultimately enabling 
value capture by western apparel firms. A series of studies of retail TNCs (Baud and 




intermediaries of financial discipline (Coe et al., 2014). In particular, FABS 
intermediaries promote the re-location of production as part of cost-reduction strategies.  
Existing research does not, however, elucidate the mechanisms creating linkages 
between FABS intermediaries and the strategies of TNCs. As Coe et al. (2014: 765, 
original emphasis) note, to date the “neglect of finance within the GPN literature means 
that it overlooked an increasingly important driver of GPN structures and strategies”. 
How do FABS configure, i.e., bring order to, the financial discipline of TNCs? It is 
possible to read-off from existing studies of FABS outside of the GPN context that of 
particular importance is the way FABS convey and enact specific narratives (Bassens and 
van Meeteren, 2015; Hall, 2006) knowledges (Beaverstock, 2004; Faulconbridge, 2007) 
and institutional arrangements (Faulconbridge and Muzio, 2015). For example, Wójcik 
and Camilleri (2015: 472) note that when TNCs seek external investment financiers 
dictate the ‘rules of the game’ and accounting and law firms ‘do the paperwork’ in the 
sense of defining the legal and other structures that must be adopted to adhere to these 
rules (see also Pistor, 2013). Indeed, of particular relevance here is recognition of the 
importance of law in structuring GPNs and determining how value is created and captured 
(IGLP Law and Global Production Working Group, 2016). As Cumming et al. (2017) 
note, structures are often a result of FABS firms insisting on changes to the legal 
organization of TNCs as part of efforts to ensure pre-defined models of liability are 
adopted and levels of return on financial investment generated.  
A shift towards more focus on the practices of FABS firms is one way of further 
deepen understanding of how FABS exercise governance effects in, GPNs. A growing 
body of work on finance (Faulconbridge and Hall, 2014; Jones and Search, 2009) and 




et al., 2017) calls for analysis of “the stabilized, routinized, or improvised social actions 
that constitute and reproduce economic space” (Jones and Murphy, 2011: 367). 
Specifically, the role of FABS can only be fully understood when research acknowledges 
that “Its micro-foundations are built on the practices of financial and business elites…that 
involves modes of power” (Bassens and van Meeteren, 2015: 755). These micro-
foundations often receive limited attention. For example, there is a tendency for “law 
making and its agents [to be] relegated to a supporting role…and legal norms, and their 
material realization, remain something of a black box” (Poon et al., 2018: 1443). Analysis 
of the practices of FABS firms – i.e., what they do, how they do it, and the implications 
for TNCs - can open such black boxes and develop an understanding of how these firms 
exercise governance influence in GPNs (Parnreiter, 2017). 
Development of an analysis of the practices of FABS can also be seen as part of 
the movement away from analysis of power relations at the level of the governance of 
production chains/networks (Gereffi et al., 2005). In particular, there has been a move 
towards analysis of power as omnipresent in GPNs, this involving both empirical (moving 
beyond a focus on lead-supplier firm dyads) and theoretical shifts (a turn to more diverse 
conceptions of governance) (Gibbon et al., 2008; Bair and Werner, 2011; Coe and Yeung, 
2015). The theoretical shift follows work that conceives of power as relational, multi-
faceted and enacted in practice (Allen, 2003; Faulconbridge, 2012). Here the focus falls 
less on the capacity and resources of actors such as FABS firms, and more on the way 
they deploy in practice these resources through interactions with the TNCs they serve. In 
particular, a governance perspective highlights the role of conventions, norms and 
systemic forms of power as equally important in GPNs as the more structural/hierarchical 




relational approach is also valuable because, as Ouma (2010) points out, attempts to 
exercise power in GPNs result in negotiated, often unpredictable outcomes which can 
only be captured by a fine-grained analysis of the practices and interactions of different 
actors. This matters in relation to FABS because, as Parnreiter (2017: 4) argues, FABS 
seem likely to exercise power not necessarily “over clients, but together with them”. This 
implies that an understanding of the nature of the relationships between FABS and TNCs 
in GPNs is crucial if we are to understand effects on TNC strategy and on in turn on GPN 
structure and spatiality.   
The rest of this paper responds to the need to better theorise the intermediary 
governance role of FABS in GPNs by considering the paper’s overarching research 
question - How do FABS intermediaries configure the financial discipline of TNCs – and 
a series of sub-questions that relate to the theoretical and empirical gaps outlined above. 
These sub-questions are: How do FABS exercise power through their relationships with 
lead and supplier firms in GPNs? How does a more sophisticated understanding of the 
intermediary role of FABS enhance conceptualizations of power, governance and its 
effects in GPNs?  These questions are addressed by considering the ways that one group 
of FABS intermediaries – legal services – influences the strategies of Southeast Asian 
TNCs.  
 
3. TNCs, finance and Southeast Asia 
The empirical focus of this paper is the role of legal services in the activities of TNCs 
operating in Southeast Asia. As a region, Southeast Asia is comprised of 11 states: Brunei 




Singapore; Thailand; and Vietnam. Southeast Asia has been an important regional focus 
in GPN research, albeit for evolving reasons. One the one hand, Southeast Asia has been 
studied as a key location for supplier firms, particularly in automobile (Coe et al., 2004), 
textiles and apparel (Gereffi, 1999) and electronics (Ernst, 2002). Here the focus has often 
been on the role of these countries in spatial divisions of labour, in particular as low cost 
locations for production. However, a complementary focus has emerged as in the 
extractive (Bridge, 2008), civil aviation and electronics (Yeung, 2016) industries amongst 
others a number of important lead firms have emerged from Southeast Asia that have 
invested within the region but also within Asia more widely and most recently in Europe 
and North America. This implies two related but distinct dynamics with regards to GPNs, 
as Southeast Asian firms take both lead and supplier roles. There is also a common factor 
affecting all Southeast Asian TNCs that is of particular relevance here: the growing 
importance of finance. 
As Yeung (2014, 2016) argues, the dominant focus on state-led development in 
Southeast Asia needs to be counter-balanced with analysis of the way TNCs entwined 
with capital markets equally influence development trajectories. Whilst state- and family-
owned firms have played a significant role in economic development in the region, firms 
have been able to “gain much better access to capital and thereby to cut the [state or 
family] ‘umbilical cord’…which had previously nurtured them” (Yeung, 2014: 81). One 
of the most visible manifestations of this is the rise in cross-border financial flows in 
Southeast Asia. Investment into Southeast Asia from other regions – from Europe and 
North America specifically – has grown by 20% between 2007 and 2016 (UNCTAD, 
2018). Equally important is the growth in intra-regional investment (see Horner and 




2009 intra-regional and extra-regional investments exceeded inward investments – in 
particular as the financial crisis forced European and North American financial 
institutions to deploy capital at home to improve balance sheets. This peak also includes 
flows from Southeast Asia to Europe and North America to take advantage of the 
investment opportunities created by the financial crisis and lack of available capital from 
within these regions. Significant transitions in a few key countries in the region, such as 
627% and 754% rises in outward investment from Thailand and Vietnam respectively 
(UNCTAD, 2018), have been particularly important. All of this raises questions about the 
way FABS intermediaries, that are crucial to FDI flows, influence the activities of TNCs 
in the region. 
Existing studies have tended to focus on the preeminent position of European and 
North American FABS firms in Southeast Asia. Historically there has been good reason 
for this. In addition to the role of these FABS in imperial projects early in the 20th century 
(Dezalay and Garth, 2010), Haberly and Wójcik (2017) show that in the first two decades 
of the new millennium these firms dominate in terms of financial investments in the 
world’s largest TNCs. Particularly important here, European and North American 
financial services firms, supported by European and North American accountancy and 
law firms (Beaverstock et al., 1999; Faulconbridge and Muzio, 2016), that have important 
investments in Asia (Liu, 2008; Wójcik and Camilleri, 2015). Indeed, those observing the 
growing influence of finance in Southeast Asia have raised questions about the impacts 
of the extension of ‘global financial architectures’ (Wade, 2007) into the region by both 
financial services firms and other intermediaries such as global law firms.  
The term ‘global financial architectures’ refers to a “regime of global economic 




the IMF but also FABS. The standards relate to matters as diverse as accounting reports, 
corporate restructuring, bankruptcy, liabilities provisions and covenants for loans and 
tend to be based on European and North American models (e.g. International Financial 
Reporting Standards) and structures (e.g. netting arrangements relating to derivate 
contracts). Wade (2007) notes that following the Asian financial crisis of the late 1990s 
organisations such as the IMF and WTO became overt supporters of the extension of 
‘global financial architectures’ into Southeast Asia – this being a condition for “cheap 
and abundant finance, on the assumption that financial firms will reward compliance and 
punish non-compliance” (Wade, 2007: 115). This has led to a ‘standards-surveillance-
compliance’ system which requires firms seeking funds through capital markets to adhere 
to ‘global financial architectures’. Tsui-Auch and Yoshikawa (2015: 2) note that this has 
led Singaporean financial services firms to adopt “Anglo-American capital market logic 
and its associated corporate governance structures…as gold standards”.  
Post 2010 the roles of FABS firms in Southeast Asia has, however, begun to 
evolve. As Wójcik et al., (2018: 13-14) note, US and European banks saw their combined 
share of worldwide deals decline by 9% and 5% respectively between 2007 and 2015. In 
the same period, the share of Asian financial services firms rose by 14%. This suggests 
changing relationships between FABS firms and Southeast Asian TNCs (e.g. European 
and North American accountancy and law firms increasingly working for Southeast Asian 
financial institutions) and in turn the governance role of FABS firms. Indeed, Wójcik and 
Camilleri (2015: 469) suggest uncertainty exist about whether European and North 
American FABS influence the strategies of Asian TNCs or whether these FABS are 




responds to this uncertainty by considering the dynamics in the period 2007-2017 of the 
role of legal service intermediaries in Southeast Asia. 
 
4. Methodology 
4.1 Case context 
The rise of global law firms is now well-documented (Beaverstock et al., 1999; 
Faulconbridge, 2008) as is their role in facilitating financial transactions (Faulconbridge, 
2007; Knox-Hayes, 2009; Wójcik, 2013). Most recently studies have emphasised the 
ability of global law firms to influence the ‘global financial architecture’ of international 
trade and capital markets. Through both their ever expanding office networks that allow 
them to reproduce rules and norms in different jurisdictions (Faulconbridge and Muzio, 
2015, 2016), and through their relationships with transnational governance organisations 
such as the WTO (Suddaby et al., 2007) and the International competition Network 
(Morgan, 2006), global law firms help set the ‘rules of the game’ which those 
participating in cross-border corporate activity must adhere (Boussebaa and 
Faulconbridge, 2018). Illustrating this, Wójcik and Camilleri (2015) highlight the central 
role of global law firms (Linklaters and Sullivan and Cromwell) in the IPO of China 
Mobile and how this led to the formation of a TNC that adopted Western capitalist 
practices refracted through a Chinese socialist lens. There is, then, a close and important 
relationship between law firms and financial service firms such as asset managers, banks, 
investment funds and private equity: law firms ‘do the paperwork’ for both these financial 
service firms when they are serving Southeast Asian TNCs, and for Southeast Asian 




In Southeast Asia global law firms have established their principal offices in 
Singapore – this being an ‘obligatory passage point’ (Allen, 2003) in Southeast Asia for 
TNCs seeking financial services (Derudder et al., 2014). There are over 100 other North 
American and European law firms with an office in Singapore (Kriegler, 2013). However, 
these offices often only have one partner, the office acting primarily as a sales outpost. 
Any deals worked on by these ‘outposts’ require lawyers to be flown in from other 
jurisdictions and revenues are low. In contrast, there are (according to the authors own 
survey) 16 global law firms that have ‘multi-practice’ offices in Singapore; i.e. offices 
able to provide advice on a range of corporate operations, from M&A to IPOs; structured 
finance to intellectual property. These 16 firms are focussed upon in this paper. ‘Multi-
practice’ firms use Singapore as a regional hub for servicing activities in all of the 
countries in Southeast Asia. The 16 ‘multi-practice’ firms are of both English origin (n=9: 
Allen & Overy; Ashursts; Clifford Chance; DLA, Freshfields; Herbert Smith; Hogan 
Lovells; Linklaters; Norton Rose Fulbright) and US origin (n=7: Baker & McKenzie; 
Jones Day; King & Spalding; Latham & Watkins; Mayer Brown; White & Case). As well 
as Singapore other key locations for offices in Southeast Asia include Bangkok (8 of 16 
firms), Hanoi (5/16), Jakarta (8/16) and Kuala Lumpur (3/16). As these numbers 
demonstrate, Singapore is by far the most significant location, and as such was chosen as 
the location to conduct interviews.  
 
4.2 Data and analysis 
The analysis focuses on the period between 2007 and 2017 as it coincides with the global 




TNCs in GPNs and the global economy more broadly. A longitudinal, dynamic analysis 
is crucial for understanding both the mechanisms through which global law firms 
configure the financial discipline of Southeast Asian TNCs and the contingencies 
affecting these mechanisms which change over time. The analysis also focuses on 
services provided by global law firms that are directly related to questions of financial 
discipline in GPNs: advice relating to mergers and acquisitions (M&As), initial public 
offerings (IPOs), bond issues and loan agreements. In these types of transaction 
relationships between financial services firms and law firms are important, as law firms 
‘do the paperwork’ on behalf of either the bank(s) financing the transaction, or the client 
TNC that has engaged a bank to support their transaction. As such, the chosen services 
are the ones that lead to law firms having the greatest influence on TNC financial 
discipline.  
Two main data sources were used to construct the analysis. First, interviews were 
completed with partners in ‘multi-practice’ global law firms in Singapore (n=21) and 
clients of global law firms (n=4). Interviews, with the exception of two, were recorded 
and fully transcribed. Interviews were analysed using a two-level coding structure. The 
first level captured the key themes illustrated in the empirical narratives of interviewees. 
First-level themes relevant to this analysis are: key clients; types of legal work; global 
law firm strategies; cross-border activities; effects of local context. Data coded in each of 
these themes was then recoded through a processes that connected empirical narratives to 
theoretical debates in the literature on FABS and GPNs. This led to the identification of 
two second-level themes relating to the ways global law firms configure the financial 
discipline of TNCs: articulating financial imperatives; governance agents. A series of 




law firms enact articulations and governance effects that are significant for the financial 
configuration of TNCs.   
Secondly, the activities of global law firms were traced using data from the 
Thomson Reuters Datastream service. The Datastream service provides information 
about deal activity and the TNCs and law firms involved. Data is available longitudinally 
by year. The Datastream service was used to identify M&A, IPO, bond and loan deals 
between 2007 and 2017 that involved Southeast Asian firms. 71,281 deals were 
identified. Unfortunately, the reporting by Datastream of the law firms acting as advisors 
on deals was incomplete - only 12,324 of the deals had complete records – and therefore 
the analysis could only focus on this sub-set of deals. Deal records were coded to allow 
descriptive statistical analysis of the characteristics of the TNCs involved, involvement 
(or not) of global law firms, the origin of the financial services firms involved in the deal, 
and the geographies of capital flows into/out of Southeast Asia. The purpose of the 
descriptive statistical exercise is to contextualise and validate the insights gained from 
interviews, especially in terms of changes over time in the role of global law firms in 
Southeast Asia.  
 
5. The global law-TNC nexus in Southeast Asia 
Since 2007, global law firms have played an important role in Southeast Asia. 42% of 
deals in the region between 2007 and 2017 involve a global law firm, either as advisor to 
a Southeast Asian TNC or one of the banks funding a deal. The rest of this analysis 
focuses upon the activities of the leading 16 firms in these deals for the reasons outlined 




acquisitions (M&A – 47% of deals), with loans (21%), equity listings (16%) and bond 
issues (16%) playing smaller roles. These deals cut across all of the major sectors in which 
GPNs are found, but reflecting FDI flows more generally, are dominated by services 
(43%) and manufacturing (18%), followed by extractive industries (15%), infrastructure 
and utilities (8%), construction (6%), transport and logistics (6%) and the public sector 
(4%). The average value of the deals global law firms are involved in between 2007 and 
2017 is US$449m. Global law firms work in all of the countries comprising Southeast 
Asia. However, Indonesia (17%), Singapore (33%) and Thailand (16%) are of most 
significance. 
Whilst the operations of global law firms in Southeast Asia were originally driven 
by the fundamental internationalization logic of following home-country clients overseas, 
and advising European and North American financial services firms in particular 
(Faulconbridge et al., 2008), post-global financial crisis ‘local’ clients in the region have 
become increasingly important. The growing role of ‘local’ clients reflects Yeung’s 
(2016) call for greater recognition of the role of finance-led development in Southeast 
Asia. Southeast Asian firms have turned to global law firms because they enable capital 
markets led expansion. This has led to growth between 2007 and 2017 in the number of 
deals worked on each year by global law firms that involve Southeast Asian firms seeking 
loans (+1237%) and issuing bonds (+334%). For Southeast Asian TNCs, the use of the 
services of global law firms enables capital markets led expansion in a two ways. 
First, when global law firms represent a Southeast Asian TNC it adds legitimacy 
to their activities in the eyes of European and North American financial service firms and 
facilitates access to funding (private equity and capital markets) provided by such firms. 




“So for me it’s all about how they [clients] can best tap into the capital markets 
outside of Singapore for that cash…they also might just want people that have got 
experience in negotiating against other international firms who represent 
investors (Partner, US firm) 
Table 1 provides exemplars of the kinds of very large deals that global law firms service 
in Southeast Asia. The firms financing the activities of Southeast Asian TNCs are 
significant given that a number of the names are those that Haberly and Wójcik (2017) 
identify as controlling global corporate activities through financial holdings in TNCs. 
Indeed, between 2007 and 2017 61% of deals in Southeast Asia involved an European or 
North American bank. This is important because global law firms are often found on both 
sides of a deal. One firm will support, by acting as trusted advisors, European and North 
American financial services firms when they deal with Southeast Asian TNCs, whilst 
another firms advises the Southeast Asian firms on how to deal with these institutions. 
Indeed, the preeminent role of Singapore as a centre for global law firms in Southeast 
Asia is, in part at least, built on the interdependency between law firms and the European 
and North American financial services firms located in the city-state.   
[Insert table 1 here] 
 
Global law firms enable capital markets led expansion, secondly, when Southeast Asian 
TNCs turn to global law firms as problem solvers. Like the case of China Mobile reported 
by Wójcik and Camilleri (2015), Southeast Asian TNCs seek to use the experience of 
global law firms when they are completing ‘first of type’ deals in Southeast Asia. For 




by the global law firms Norton Rose, Ashursts and Hogan Lovells. Southeast Asian TNCs 
ask global law firms to identify solutions that address their corporate needs and, as one 
lawyer reported, “the first question they [Southeast Asian TNCs] ask, tell us what do your 
international clients do in this situation, because they want to portray the picture that 
they are all taking that kind of direction as well” (Partner, English firm). 
Southeast Asian firms also call on the services of global law firms when they 
enable global reach. One of the most significant trends between 2007 and 2017 has been 
the growing extra-regional investment of Southeast Asian firms. Figure 1 reveals that 
Europe (from 11% to 17%) and North America (from 5% to 10%) have become 
increasingly significant locations for acquisitions led by Southeast Asian firms. The 
nature of this work varies dramatically, from “real estate in London, commercial real 
estate” (Partner, English firm) to “golf courses in the UK to pig farms in Russia” (Partner, 
US firm). The top 3 sectors for the deals led by Southeast Asian firms in Europe and 
North America are services (Europe 38% of deals, North America 39%), manufacturing 
(30% and 34%) and extractive industries (15% and 14%). 
[Insert figure 1 here] 
 
The use of the services of global law firms enables global reach because, for the various 
financially interested parties involved, including in the case of M&As those with assets 
in the European or North American companies being acquired, perceptions of risk are 
reduced. This is because of the experience of global law firms in handling such deals, and 




demand. It means avoiding a situation in which “the bank is going to want to turn it [the 
firm and deal] upside down and start again” (Partner, English firm).  
Southeast Asian TNCs are, then, strategically calculating in their use of global law 
firms in that they recognise that it will enable them to achieve their goals. Global law 
firms exercise power ‘with’ Southeast Asian TNCs; both parties interests being served as 
the former get to develop a new client base and the latter have their capital market led 
expansion and global reach enabled. What, then, are the implications of this 
interdependency between Southeast Asian TNCs and global law firms for our 
understanding of the intermediary role of FABS in GPNs? 
 
6 Global law firms as governance agents 
The approach of global law firms when advising Southeast Asian TNCs is heavily 
influenced by presumptions about the value and legitimacy of the ‘global financial 
architectures’ (Wade, 2007) described above in the literature review. i.e., the legitimacy 
of models, structures and standards used in Europe and North America, and London and 
New York especially given that most global law firms originate from these two cities. 
When advising Southeast Asian TNCs global law firms articulate financial imperatives 
by outlining the merits of and reasons for adopting approaches prescribed by the likes of 
the International Monetary Fund, International Competition Network and others. Very 
practically, this results in global law firms seeking in Southeast Asia to “build here an 
exact replica of a highly sophisticated finance team from a global financial centre 
(Partner, English firm). This replication allows transactions to be structured in ways that 




approaches [being] very similar [because] our clients are interested if they [deals] are 
commercially investable which means that the requirements are quite similar to those of 
the developed countries” (Partner, US firm). There are a two specific ways that this 
‘replication’ approach affects the articulation of financial imperatives in Southeast Asia 
by global law firms.  
First, global law firms seek to standardize legal doctrine. Virtually all of the deals 
that global law firms work on are structured in English or New York law. English and 
New York law are used because lawyers “worry that something will come up in the local 
jurisdiction or under the local law which is unexpected (Partner, US law firm). 
Interviewees thus regularly referred to the ‘boiler plates’ – i.e., standard documents 
developed in London or New York – which are backed by case precedent and used as the 
starting point for deals. As one interviewee put it, “from a project finance perspective it’s 
not really any different at all and so I’ve done the same thing in London, Abu Dhabi and 
Singapore” (Partner, English firm).  
Second, global law firms articulate financial imperatives by seeking to transpose 
financial structures into Southeast Asia. This transposing involves them promoting 
structures developed in Europe and North America for the key parts of a deal. In some 
cases the approach is mechanistic. The starting premise is that:  
“an M&A transaction is an M&A transaction wherever you go…for example there 
is standardisation in the market here on loan documentation.  So there’s the Loan 
Markets Association in London, there’s the Asia Pacific Loan Market Association.  
They all start from a basic level and they look, they have 90% of the same DNA 




In other cases, the approach involves re-purposing approaches so that common structures 
can be used to resolve regionally specific challenges. For instance, one interviewee 
described how “in Asia there’s a lot of inherent risk in transactions around credit, equity, 
FX etc”. Global law firms respond by using “Some of the techniques that we use in the 
securitisation world or in the derivatives world to manage those risks, we can put into or 
the back end of a very vanilla transaction’ (Partner, US firm).  
Global law firms play, then, a significant role in the articulation of financial 
imperatives in Southeast Asia. Their approach is premised on the promotion and 
reproduction of ‘global financial architectures’, in particular as a result of the reliance on 
English and New York law, and financial structures developed in Europe and North 
America. These structures then have implications for financial discipline; matters such as 
assignments of rights, liabilities, reporting protocols, netting agreements in the case of 
bankruptcy etc. However, the articulation of these financial imperatives does not 
necessarily result in the straightforward adoption by Southeast Asian TNCs of the models 
and structures promoted. When articulating financial imperatives, lawyers in global law 
firms encounter a range of reactions from Southeast Asian TNCs that are generated by 
temporally and spatially specific power relations. As outlined above, on some occasions 
global law firms exercise power with Southeast Asian TNCs, with their prescriptions 
embraced because they enable capital markets led expansion and global reach. However, 
this is not the only reaction that determines the kinds of governance effect that law firms 







When attempting to transpose and standardize, lawyers in global law firms at times to 
impose ‘global financial architectures’ on Southeast Asian TNCs. This is most common 
when the global law firm represents a European or North American bank that is 
demanding a particular approach to a deal. In such circumstances, approaches that do not 
mimic those used in Europe or North America are presented as alterity that is risky or 
simply unfamiliar and thus unacceptable. There is much that can be said about such an 
approach from a postcolonial perspective (Pollard and Sammers, 2007; Pollard et al., 
2009). Most importantly here, it highlights a neo-colonial (Boussebaa et al., 2012) 
approach by global law firms as they seek to impose against alterity ‘global financial 
architectures’ on the basis of presumed superiority. Illustrating this imposition against 
alterity, lawyers made comments in interviews such as “Asia is much further behind than 
Europe has ever been” (Partner, English firm) and: 
“So that when you’re negotiating with [deal party x] you say look I’m really 
concerned about political force and how I’m protected in that instance.  When 
they say sorry that’s your problem you can say well actually you’ll find that in 35 
out of the last 37 projects globally [actor x] has taken that risk, so you are 
completely out of line with the international market on this” (Partner, English 
firm) 
Global law firms will also justify their approach with reference to extra-territorial 
regulation enacted by amongst others the European Union and the US Securities and 
Exchange Commission. Frameworks such as Basel3, MiFID2, the US Foreign Corrupt 




adoption of financial discipline by the Southeast Asian firms involved that match the 
approaches used in Europe and North America. This applies both to the 61% of deals in 
which a European or American bank is part of the financing team, but also to many more 
deals because of the indirect involvement of parties based in Europe or the USA. For 
instance, a M&A deal financed from Asia which involves one Southeast Asian company 
acquiring another may come under the auspices of European extra-territorial rules if a 
bank based in Europe has financial assets in the acquired company (e.g. via a loan to one 
of the acquired company’s subsidiaries). As one interviewee summarised the approach 
that results from such applicability of extra-territorial law: So there’s quite a bit of, so a 
lot of the stuff that I did in Europe in the period of when Basel1 came in, the period 2000-
4, I’m now replicating in Asia (Partner, US firm).   
 Forms of imposition can, then, be an important means by which global law firms 
govern the financial configuration of Southeast Asian TNCs. When imposition occurs 
‘global financial architectures’ are reproduced in Southeast Asia along with the associated 
financial discipline which has been shown to affect the organisation of GPNs (Baud and 
Durand, 2012; Coe et al., 2014; Coe and Yeung, 2015; Milberg, 2008; Wood et al., 2016). 
However, alongside imposition and power enacted with Southeast Asian TNCs, both of 
which enable the reproduction of ‘global financial architectures’, a third dynamic in 
power relations also matters and is increasingly important in determining the governance 








In addition to exercising power with and over Southeast Asian TNCs, in some scenarios 
the relationship is reversed and global law firms have power exercised over them by 
Southeast Asian TNCs. Two interrelated developments in Southeast Asia between 2007 
and 2017 are particularly significant in explaining why and how power is exercised over 
global law firms. First, a significant longitudinal trend in the deals worked on by global 
law firms is the declining role of European and North American financial services firms 
towards the end of the period of analysis. Figure 2 reveals a fall from 73% to 54% of 
deals each year involving an European or North American bank, and at the same time a 
rise from 10% to 18% of deals involving a Southeast Asian bank. Importantly, by 2017 
20% of all deals are funded entirely by financial services firms from within the Asia 
region. Particularly notable is the growing liquidity of Southeast Asian financial services 
firms in the key economies of Indonesia, Thailand and Singapore. It is now common for 
financial services firms from these countries to be in a position provide all of the funding 
required for a deal and to have previous experience of most deal types. This is especially 
important for the increasingly buoyant intra-regional deals market (see Horner and Navid, 
2018). For example, 25% of M&A deals that global law firms work on in Southeast Asia 
involve a Southeast Asian firm acquiring another firm in the region, and in such cases the 
financing is highly likely to come from a Southeast Asian financial service firm.  
[Insert figure 2 here] 
 
Relatedly, second, Southeast Asian law firms have, over time, become fiercer competitors 




experience of common deal types and are increasingly able to meet the needs of ‘local’ 
TNCs. Singaporean law firms are especially important in this regard. The Singaporean 
government has prioritised capacity development in the local legal profession and as one 
lawyer noted:  
“Allen & Gledhill [a Singaporean law firm] I know are sort of advertising 
themselves as saying you know if you’re doing Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Thailand, Vietnam, if you had a deal that has those five jurisdictions in it why 
would you need an international firm, use a Singapore firm with regional 
network” (Partner, English firm). 
Indeed, one interviewee even suggested that competition from Singaporean firms has 
meant that global firms have changed their market strategies and “don’t really go near 
debit capital markets because they [Singaporean firms] do that. We don’t do much 
syndicate lending in this market because they do that” (Partner, English firm) 
These two developments – the maturity of Southeast Asian banks and law firms - 
have implications for the ability of global law firms to transpose financial structures and 
standardize legal doctrine. When funding sources or deal activity are all within Southeast 
Asia, the models and structures used are much less likely to be influenced by ‘global 
financial architectures’. As one interviewee noted:  
If you go to Malaysia where there’s a very deep Malaysian bank liquidity you’ll 
find that say for example a power project in Malaysia, done by a Malaysian 
developer, who’ll be able to raise all of that debt in the Malaysian market will be 




banks, all the participants are Malaysian, why do English law, they’re all 
comfortable with Malaysian (Partner, US firm) 
As a result, during the latter years of the 2007-2017 period of analysis global law firms 
found that “there is a level of what we call customisation, nuancing which needs to be 
done” (Partner, English firm). Global law firms have had to offer new services and 
approaches to deals – in particular the adaptation or abandonment of the parts of a model 
or structure which do not serve the interests of Southeast Asian firms. This relates to the 
way that Southeast Asian firms have created new connections to capital markets, but have 
done so in ways that serve their development interests and paths. In some cases these 
paths remain part-defined by powerful family or state interests, but in other cases 
Southeast Asian TNCs have cut their ‘umbilical cord’ (Yeung, 2014: 81) connections to 
the state and/or family finances and simply seek to forge their own distinctive approaches 
and question the ‘global financial architectures’ taken-for-granted by global law firms.   
Consequently, a process of refraction increasingly occurs. Refraction in this 
context refers to the way deal models and structures are redirected to serve the interests 
and priorities of Southeast Asian TNCs. As one lawyer noted, “it’s like every single line 
of the document…every single deal they want to sit and go over every single line’ (Partner, 
English firm). Lawyers working for global law firms increasingly recognise that 
Southeast Asian clients will insist on reworking models and structures and that they must 
accommodate this, not least because Southeast Asian TNCs have become an increasingly 
important client base post global financial crisis as part of efforts to offset reduced 




“clients tend to be less willing to accept well this is the way it’s done….you have 
clients who say well I want it done this way. Ok well that’s quite difficult why 
don’t you do this? No, no I want that.  Ok fine we can do it, it’s much harder.  
Yeah, yeah do it.  So generally speaking no two deals are the same in Asia.  
Everything is different, everything has got its own nuances and its own variety” 
(Partner, English firm) 
Indicative of the refraction process is the increased questioning of the pre-eminence of 
English and New York law. For example, “in cross border M&A deals increasingly 
Singapore law is the governing law of many of the contracts, even where no Singapore 
entity is concerned (Partner, US firm). The adoption of alternative legal systems even 
occurs when “you’ve got a European multinational who wants to invest into let’s say for 
example Indonesia…English law probably would be ideal for them because it’s 
something they’re more used to but it’s too far removed from let’s say the Southeast Asian 
party. Singapore law is a compromise” (Partner, US firm). Indeed, in response to such 
developments nine of the 16 ‘multi-practice’ global law firms have gained licenses to 
practice Singaporean law, this also being necessary to counter increasing competition 
from Singapore’s corporate law firms that have aggressively sought to capture intra-
regional deal work from global law firms. The Singaporean government deliberately 
launched its Foreign Law Practice scheme to entice global firms to practice Singaporean 
law. This in turn has encouraged more Southeast Asian TNCs to ask for deals to be 
structured in Singapore law, has allowed Singaporean law firms to compete on deals as 
the use of Singaporean law has increased, and has provided a stream of activity for the 




The waning influence of European and North American financial services firms, the 
growing maturity of Southeast Asian TNCs, financial services firms and law firms, and 
thus the ability of Southeast Asian TNCs to resist imposition and respond to the 
articulation of financial imperatives in ways designed to serve their interests and not just 
replicate ‘global financial architectures’ leads, then, to global law firms having variegated 
governance effects. The following section reflects on this duality in power relations and 
the implications of the tussles between global law firms and their clients for how we 
conceptualise the governance effects of FABS. 
      
7 FABS intermediaries and the configuring of financial discipline in TNCs  
The analysis above outlines how global law firms configure the financial discipline of 
TNCs. Figure 3 summarises the mechanisms involved. The outcome is the potential for 
the emergence in TNCs of the kinds of financial discipline noted in existing studies of 
GPNs to be a crucial governance influence (Baud and Durand, 2012; Coe et al., 2014; 
Coe and Yeung, 2015; Milberg, 2008; Wood et al., 2016). Figure 3 also illustrates, 
however, that the governance effects of FABS are territorially specific. Refraction results 
from the local specificities of the power relations between global law firms and their TNC 
clients. The result is the adoption but equally the adaptation of ‘global financial 
architectures’ as Southeast Asian TNCs pursue their own interests.  
[Insert figure 3 here] 
 
In terms of the mechanisms configuring the financial discipline of TNCs, figure 3 reveals, 




how global law firms articulate financial imperatives – i.e., proliferate particular 
understandings of what is legitimate when engaging in common deals (M&As, IPOs, 
structured financing etc). Articulation is achieved by global law firms championing 
English and New York law as they standardize legal doctrine, and by seeking to 
reproduce structures and models developed in Europe and North America as they 
transpose financial structures into Southeast Asia. Consequently, lead and supplier firms 
in GPNs, that are reliant on international financial markets for funding that allows their 
expansion and acquisitions, find that their legal structuring as organizations, their 
liabilities and accountabilities, and in turn their strategies are affected by their 
relationships with FABS and the particular imperatives they champion and proliferate.  
The analysis of the articulation of financial imperatives presented here thus 
reveals the importance of in-depth studies of intermediary influences on the strategies of 
TNCs as part of analyses of wider issues of GPN form and effect. In particular, it 
highlights the need to study the practices of FABS intermediaries, the way these practices 
are enacted in relationships with TNCs, and the impacts on the kinds of financial 
discipline affecting TNCs and their strategies. By understanding in-depth what FABS do, 
how they do it, and the implications for TNCs it becomes possible to open the black box 
of intermediary effects that others (Coe and Yeung, 2015; Parnreiter, 2017; Poon et al., 
2018) have highlighted as limiting our understanding of  FABS governance in GPNs.  
However, figure 3 and the analysis above also show that the effects of power 
relations between FABS and their clients on the configuring of financial discipline also 
need consideration. Power relations manifest themselves in three ways. Forms of 
enablement: when FABS exercise power with Southeast Asian TNCs, given the 




architectures’. In such scenarios there is an interdependency between global law firms 
and Southeast Asian TNCs; the former get to operationalise their preferred approach to 
deals; the latter get to exploit international financial markets to achieve their corporate 
ambitions. Figure 3 also reveals, however, forms of imposition: when FABS exercise 
power over Southeast Asian TNCs. The effects of extra-territorial and alterity imposition 
are key here and lead to Southeast Asian TNCs adopting ‘global financial architectures’ 
because of the way global law firms present them as the only suitable approach. 
Imposition and enablement driven adoption is, however, mediated by forms of refraction 
when Southeast Asian TNCs exercise power over FABS. Refraction is significant because 
it has the potential to result in the repurposing of ‘global financial architectures’. This has 
become increasingly important over time and relates to the ability of Southeast Asian 
TNCs to counteract attempts by global law firms to promote ‘global financial 
architectures’.  
Refraction matters because it is a mechanism that has the potential to produce 
variegated models and structures, designed to service the particular priorities of firms in 
the region. The focus here has not been on documenting the variegated models and 
structures produced. Rather, the focus has been on understanding how power 
relationships between FABS and Southeast Asian TNCs result in refraction that has the 
potential to produce variegation. The analysis shows that the growing power of Southeast 
Asian TNCs over global law firms allows them to appropriate ‘global financial 
architectures’ for their own purposes. This creates tussles between global law firms and 
Southeast Asian TNCs. For example, as the bi-directional arrow in figure 3 between 




imposition, this dynamic being indicative of the crucial importance of understanding the 
subtleties of the power relations between FABS and TNCs. 
The analysis of power in figure 3 contributes, then, to the reconceptualising of 
power in studies of GPNs (Gibbon et al., 2008; Bair and Werner, 2011; Coe and Yeung, 
2015) and movement beyond lead-supplier dyads in analyses (Dallas et al., 2017). It 
demonstrates the importance of considering intermediaries as key actors in GPNs, with 
power relations between intermediaries and TNCs being crucial in defining the corporate 
strategies that ultimately influence GPN form and spatiality. It highlights the value of a 
relational approach that takes account of the duality of power (Faulconbridge, 2012) – i.e. 
the role of both those seeking to exercise power and those having power exercised over 
them. This matters because the governance effects of intermediaries are not pre-
determined. FABS exercise governance through the conventions and norms they 
articulate, but the effects of articulation are determined by the reactions of Southeast 
Asian TNCs that vary from situation to situation and over time. This explains why 
attempts to exercise power in GPNs result in negotiated, often unpredictable outcomes 
(Ouma, 2010). There is no single governance effect of FABS. Rather temporally and 
spatially specific power relations mediate the effects on a deal-by-deal basis. 
In the case of global law firms and Southeast Asian TNCs, the dynamics of power 
relations relate to territorially specific developments in the region over time: the 
strengthening of local financial services firms; regulatory changes in Singapore relating 
to law firms and the associated development of the Singapore International Arbitration 
Centre; changes in the balance of geo-economic power post-financial crisis as Asia 
becomes more significant in the strategies of global law firms; and the related year on 




in the region. This demonstrates the importance to a dynamic theory of GPNs (Coe and 
Yeung, 2015) of analyses of power that adopt a relational view which study the 
specificities of the interactions between a range of situated actors in GPNs. Such analyses 
are reliant on the in-depth practice focussed epistemology adopted here but also 
recognition of the way key mechanisms affecting the form of GPNs operate in temporally 
and spatially embedded ways that generate subtly different outcomes in different places 
over time. In relation to the configuring of financial discipline in TNCs by FABS, 
dynamics matter because they generate power relations that can produce variegated 
governance effects and outcomes. Hence, whilst the mechanisms identified in figure 3 are 
likely to remain consistent in different regions, what is observed here in Southeast Asia 
in terms of the specific effects of enablement, imposition and refraction might not 
necessarily be replicated in an identical way in other regions. And, therefore, the 
governance outcomes may be subtly different with implications for GPN structure and 
spatiality.   
 
8 Conclusions 
In responding to the question ‘How do FABS intermediaries configure the financial 
discipline of TNCs’ this paper provides two key insights into the role of intermediaries in 
GPNs. First, and in line with calls for greater focus on the TNCs in GPNs (Coe and Yeung, 
2015; Fuller and Phelps, 2018), the analysis reveals the importance of viewing 
intermediaries as active institutional agents (Beaverstock et al., 2010; Coe et al., 2009; 
Phelps and Wood, in press) that influence the organization and strategies of the TNCs 




configure the financial discipline of Southeast Asian TNCs by articulating particular 
financial imperatives. Second, the paper demonstrates the central role of power relations 
in determining the effects of intermediaries. By addressing two specific sub-questions - 
How do FABS exercise power through their relationships with lead and supplier firms in 
GPNs? How does a more sophisticated understanding of the intermediary role of FABS 
enhance conceptualizations of power, governance and it effects in GPNs? - the paper 
shows how power relations are spatially and temporally contingent, here this relating to 
the specifics of interactions between global law firms and Southeast Asian TNCs and how 
these interactions change over time. The result in Southeast Asia is global law firms 
exerting variegated governance effects that involve more than standardization and 
transposition based on ‘global financial architectures’. This finding reveals the 
importance of refined conceptions of power and governance in GPNs that take account 
of the range of actors governing GPN structure and spatiality and the practice level 
operation and duality of power effects. 
By focussing on intermediary agency and power relations the analysis identifies 
two key mechanisms, applicable beyond the specifics of global law firms, that affect how 
FABS configure the financial discipline of TNCs: the articulating of financial 
imperatives; and refraction. It seems likely that these mechanisms are applicable to a 
range of different FABS; for example there are traces of these mechanisms in the stories 
told by Munir et al. (2018) and Parnreiter (2017). The analysis thus provides a model that 
can be tested through studies of other FABS, and/or through studies of global law firms 
in other world regions, and used to explain the widely ignored yet crucial governance role 




The analysis also offers new insights into the specific effects of the dynamic 
relationships between FABS intermediaries and Southeast Asian TNCs. In the context of 
regions such as Southeast Asia it has been noted that the influence of finance results in 
“distinct qualitative changes in the way economic agents relate to international financial 
markets” (Bortz and Kaltenbrunner, 2017: 386). This connects to the suggestion that 
international finance results in “the transfer of corporate governance, such as the 
proliferation of governance codes around the globe” (Cumming et al., (2017: 142). The 
analysis presented here moves beyond such suggestions of ‘change’ and ‘transfer’, and 
the observation in existing literatures that financial discipline affects GPNs (Coe et al., 
2014; Coe and Yeung, 2015) and leads to particular strategic priorities (Baud and Durand, 
2012; Milberg, 2008; Wood et al., 2016). It reveals the way Southeast Asian TNCs are 
adept at deploying ‘global financial architectures’ to serve their own interests, with 
European and North American FABS acting as servants when enabling access to finance 
and allowing Southeast Asian TNCs to achieve their goals on their own terms. This does 
not mean FABS do not act as discipliners – they do this when circumstances allow them 
to constrain the approach adopted, potentially against the wishes of a Southeast Asian 
TNC. However, the analysis shows how this disciplining is increasingly counteracted, 
with Southeast Asian TNCs able to repurpose and adapt ‘global financial architectures’ 
in ways that suit their priorities. As Wójcik and Camilleri (2015) highlight using the case 
of China Mobile, this can produce completely new financial structures, and not just 
involve the appropriation of models and structures deployed previously in Europe and 
North America. As such, the analysis here reveals how FABS intermediaries can facilitate 




kinds of discipline reported in studies of GPNs comprised of European and North 
American lead firms.  
Future research should, then, examine more thoroughly the role of intermediaries 
in GPNs. The focus in this analysis has been on the specifics of law firms and Southeast 
Asian TNCs. An immediate question, therefore, relates to the role and effects of 
intermediaries in different geographical contexts. For example, are the impacts similar in 
other parts of Asia and Africa? More generally, the role of other FABS (accountants, 
management consultants etc) should be considered: do the mechanisms identifies apply 
to these intermediaries? In addition, it seems important to consider more fully the nature 
and effects of the refraction reported here. Analysis that focuses upon specific TNCs, the 
way they engage with intermediaries, resist, adopt and adapt particular models and 
structures, and the impacts on strategies would bring richer insights into how the spatiality 
and territoriality of GPNs is affected by intermediaries.   
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Figure 3. How FABS configure the financial discipline of TNCs 
 
 
 
 
 
